5 Aralık 2007 Çarşamba

After the Annapolis: Peace is Really Difficult in the Middle East



After the Annapolis: Peace is Really Difficult in the Middle East


Serpil ACIKALIN
USAK
Wednesday , 05 December 2007

A week after the Annapolis Summit, Palestinians, Israelis and more than 40 state’delegations are pleased to announce its end without a fiasco. As there were no strong expectations, it was not difficult to satisfy the delegates. If one reviews today’s news he/she will see political landscape’s changing as the 2008 presidential elections for the U.S. approach and as the Iranian nuclear program worries Israel.

In last week’s Summit, President Bush was tired of Iraq; Israeli PM Olmert was the loser in the eyes of his public for failures in Lebanon and corruption; and Palestinian President Abbas was talking to ‘the ghost of Hamas’. Three ‘weak’ leaders were in front of the public without touching the core issues of the conflict and the deadline of 2008 looming. The result is biweekly meetings between Olmert and Abbas and a relaunch of the road map.

The first road map was announced by President George W. Bush in 2002 June. The Middle East Quartet issued the document one year later in 2003 May following the Iraq War. According to the document, the final date was 2005 for signing the final status agreement after the transitional process to manage the normalization following the establishment of institutions. The emphasis was to end violation and terror in the region to solve the conflict. Because of the unforeseen developments all the plans had to change direction and we came to today.

The parties came to a decision for a Joint Declaration only minutes before the Summit began. Among the participants the Arabs were particularly concerned about its fate and they asked the question, “Why are we here?”. It was a success for Israel to gain the attendance of almost all Arab countries. The aim of isolating Iran is accomplished by the participation of Syria and secret negotiations to be conducted with Syria after the Summit.

After sixty years from 29 November 1947 (the date of recommendation of UN Resolution 181 to divide Mandate Palestine) Bush reaffirmed his support for a two state solution but he didn’t provide adequate details. And after fourteen years from the official peace agreements we again witnessed that peace is ellusive in the Middle East.

When the leaders returned to their homes they began expecting great effort to persuade their people. Abbas called the Annapolis Summit a historical event, the aim being on end to the occupation of Israel in the territories (including East Jerusalem) and to find a solution for refugees based on UN Resolution 194. On Sunday, Olmert submitted a document to the cabinet and said that there is no timetable and the security of Israel is the core precondition for future meetings.

Radicals in Israel and Palestine protested the Summit and claimed that noone has the right to provide concessions on their behalf. There is no doubt about the immediate needs to improve conditions in the West Bank, economic issues, and checkpoints.However, we are most concerned about the possible humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Cutting of fuel continuous and a possibile intervention to the Gaza Strip is not in the distant future.

In the Annapolis Summit, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Ali Babacan, also stressed four needs for both nations: the continuation of the existing political dialog, providing security for both nations, the improvement of economic relations and the acceptance of differences between the two nations as a source of richness. These points are important to carry out sustainable development beteew any nations and the most for Palestinians and Israelis.

At the end of the day, we understand that Bush supports Road Map and we should accept that the last week’s Summit is not a result but the beginning of a thorny ‘peace process’. Secondly, we have learned from our previous experiences that if there are any radical developments in Palestinian politics, like the death of Arafat in 2004 or 2006 election results, the fate of the second Road Map will not be different from the first....http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2304/after-the-annapolis-peace-is-really-difficult-in-the-middle-east.html

Wednesday , 05 December 2007
Serpil ACIKALIN
USAK

30 Kasım 2007 Cuma

Captured U.S Origin Weapons Increased the Tensions Between Turkey, Iraq and US


Friday , 13 July 2007



By Serpil ACIKALIN (USAK)

On Wednesday the Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Nabi Sensoy, stated that the PKK terrorist organization has weapons of U.S. origin, but he suggested that he does not believe the weapons were given to the PKK militias directly by the U.S.. Mr. Sensoy added that the weapons may be coming from the supplies provided by the U.S. military to the Iraqi government.
Mr. Sensoy also emphasized that Turkey had demanded that Washington use its influence on the Iraqi Kurds to end their support to for PKK activities in the region and to force Barzani and his supporters to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization and lay the legal groundwork for measures to be taken against the PKK in the North of Iraq. Turkish Ambassador Sensoy said that the Turkish nation does not have any more patience on this issue and the weapons found on the captured PKK terrorists indicate that the US and Iraqi officials are “not doing enough” to prevent PKK attacks . As a result, Turkey reserves the right to carry out military action against the PKK. “Those who help the PKK terrorists share their goals,” Nabi Sensoy said. Turkey has been fighting against PKK terrorist organization since 1980s and up until today more than 40.000 people have been killed by PKK terrorism. The PKK is considered a terrorist organization by the US and EU. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ihsan Bal from USAK, an Ankara based Turkish think tank, said that confessions of previously captured terrorists and equipment captured in terrorist operations proved that there are some U.S supplied weapons passed to the PKK and were used by this terrorist organization against Turkish civilian and military targets. Turkey is trying to get the support of the U.S to put pressure on Iraq. Dr. Bal emphasized that the reason the U.S. invaded Iraq was to stop the alleged production of “chemical and other weapons” and that the situation of today is very similar. Thus he said the U.S. must restrict terrorist’s use of these weapons because it is impossible to bargain with the kind of organizations who attack civilians. Dr. Bal argued that the Turkish people are disappointed because the US has not fulfilled its responsibilities in Iraq. Speaking about the possible Turkish operation, Dr. Bal said that Turkey must demonstrate that all the diplomatic approaches have been tried to legitimize it and that the effect and role of the U.S. would be very significant. In speeches Turkish diplomats are explicitly and implicitly stating that there are no alternatives beside a cross border operation. As an ally of Turkey, he U.S. must cooperate with Turkey to solve the problem. A very important point emphasized by Dr. Bal was that Barzani must choose whether he prefers to cooperate with a terrorist organization which kills civilians every day or prefers to work with the Turkish people who are contributing to Iraq’s development by investing in the country. He added that the U.S. must take into consideration the Turkish Ambassador’s speech and that if the U.S. adopts the measures contained in it, relations between the U.S. and Turkey may improve in the future.All these improvements and speeches demonstrate that a new process is beginning between the U.S. and Turkey and mutual measures and actions will define the future of the relationship. The tension between Turkey and Iraq is being exacerbated by the news and the existence of PKK in the North of Iraq. Turkey hopes to see a concrete step from U.S. and the adoption of measures to address the problem. Although Barzani knows of the terrorist camps in the region, he has made no attempt to close them, or to prevent the establishment of new ones, while simultaneously refusing to accept any possible Turkish intervention. The Turkish Ambassador’s speech looms large in this new and sensitive process . The following days will show its effects.

http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/46832/captured-u-s-origin-weapons-increased-the-tensions-between-turkey-iraq-and-us.html

Serpil AÇIKALIN


13.07.2007

Is Annapolis Only a Dream For Palestinians?



Is Annapolis Only a Dream For Palestinians?
Serpil ACIKALIN

Friday , 23 November 2007

At the end of July 2000, the U.S. President Bill Clinton declared that after 14 days of intensive bargains between the Israel and Palestine, the negotiations at the Camp David Summit ended without reaching an agreement. In reality, the Summit remains the closest milestone for two state solution through the years for both Palestinians and Israelis. Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak were under domestic pressures about “concessions” and they were called for their obligations to their people through the days. Failing to reach a solution at Camp David triggered violent events leading to the second Intifada in September of this year.

Nowadays, seven years after the Camp David Summit, Olmert and Abbas have been working for several months for another peace initiative. The shuttle diplomacy of the U.S. and the efforts of some Arab Countries led to the preliminary success of Annapolis Summit.

The date of Annapolis Summit was 27th November and announced only one week before the Summit. This date will also be written in history like the previous conferences and negotiations including the Madrid Conference, Oslo Process and Camp David Summit.

For Tuesday’s summit, most are aware that it is more a gesture before Bush leaves office and it has a large symbolic meaning. Rice has visited the region many times this year and talked to Abbas and Olmert to convince them for a joint declaration. Moreover, the previous week Peres and Abbas visited Turkey and had a chance to listen to each other in the Turkish Great National Assembly. However, the most striking point in their speeches was that Abbas insistment on the core issues of the region. What was understood after their speeches was that the Israeli side was reluctant to talk about the “concessions” and Abbas was feeling personaly responsible for Palestinians on the core issues. He not only talked about an independent Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital, but also rights of return for refugees, the Golan Heights and other annexations of Palestinian land.

The expectations from the Annapolis Summit go beyond a photo-op of delegations and seek to reach a lasting peace agreement. However, it seems impossible for this now. The Israeli side insists that the summit is just a beginning and constitutes a basis for future negotiations between two parties. Until now, the first condition was to guarantee Israel’s security for the next years, but it is difficult to interpret and define the concept of security.

Last week, another discussion about the concept of “Jewish State” surfaced in Israel and many Arabs including the Arab members of Knesset were against to this definition. Arguments for their opposition included that Arab residents of Israel would loss their citizenship rights and refugees would loose their claim to the right of return. They blamed Israel for being racist reinforced by the speech of Tzipi Livni. She stated that Palestinians already have a state, which is Jordan, as they constitute about %70 of the country, and Israel is doing Palestinians a favor by providing the second country for all the Palestinians including the Arab residents of Israel.

49 countries and international organizations are invited to Annapolis, however the most significant support from the Arab countries await. Egypt is the leader of all Arab countries, because it has contact with Israel and can convince the other Arab leaders to participate in the Annapolis Summit. Only after the Arab League’s meeting, Saudi Arabia and Syria have changed their mind and will attend the summit. Previously Syria had announced that it would not attend the meeting unless the recovery of Golan Heights is on the agenda. It was not so surprising to see this kind of reaction from Syria, but it seems irrational for Israel to play the card of Golan Heights for the expense of such a symbolic meeting. Abbas planned to persuade the Arabs in the Arab League to participate and he was successful in this effort.

According to polls of Al-Najah University, only 30 percent of Palestinians believe in the success of Annapolis Summit while 55 percent believe it will fail. Even though the expectations are very low, it is highly probable that the result of the summit will be a disappointment for Palestinians. However, the most important questions remain: what should we expect in the future after the summit and what is to be done in the days following Annapolis?....http://www.turkishweekly.net/op-ed/2301/is-annapolis-only-a-dream-for-palestinians.html

What is the Cost of the PKK for Barzani?





By Serpil ACIKALIN
Thursday , 19 July 2007

It is not a secret that two Iraqi Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, desire an extraordinary free autonomous or federal country (if not fully independent) for the Kurds in Iraq.

In the past, Mullah Moustafa Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s father, had established the first but short lived Kurdish State in 1946, Kurdish Madabad Republic. And today Masoud Barzani himself is looking to become great leader for the Kurds by establishing a permanent, large as possible and as possible independent Kurdish entity in the region. However Iraqi Kurds are not so lucky with regard to their neighbors, surrounded by the countries listed in President George W. Bush’s ‘axis of evil" speech, Syria to the west and Iran to the east. In addition to the problematic neighbors, Kurds live in such a country where many people are dying everyday because of the interminable conflict. In the North there are troublesome stirrings in the mountains on the border with Turkey. Turks are also not happy with Barzani’s and Talabani’s independence dreams, and the Turks are strong enough to prevent Iraqi Kurdish separatists.

From this point it seems that the most likely the only country is Turkey which can prevent achieving an independent or autonomous or independent Kurdish State and Barzani is too aware of this basic fact. He thinks that if he can keep Turkey from acting at least for a short time his independent or autonomous Kurdish State dream may become real. U.S support for Barzani and PKK terrorism both are the most crucial tools in Barzani’s Turkey plans.

After the 2003 invasion, the U.S. could not find any reliable ally in Iraq but the Kurds, and in return the Americans provided an explicit support for them. In this process, the Kurds basked in this situation. Furthermore, the US armed Kurdish Peshmerga guerrillas to play a role similar to that of an army. The Kurds helped a lot in American military operations and the Kurdish towns became the only relatively secure places for the Americans in Iraq. Kurds have been reliable partners for the Americans during the Iraqi occupation, however it is understood from the past experiments that the U.S. has not been a trustworthy partner for Iraqi Kurdish people. In the 1970s, 80s and the beginning of the 90s the US provoked Iraqi Kurdish rebellions by promising to help but in general Kurds were left in the lurch by the U.S.

When the Kurds were faced with the threat of annihilation in the wake of the First Gulf War, the U.S. did it again and left the Kurds alone before Saddam armies. Hereby, the only country has been Turkey which has not betrayed Iraqi Kurds in history and the recent debates in Washington DC vividly show that one more treason comes from the Americans.

The Democrats in the U.S. today see how American Iraq policy based on mainly Kurds has been unsuccessful and they say that these kind of policies will not be implemented when they get into power. This situation does not give any hope to Iraqi Kurds for their future. Similarly Baker and Hamilton Report criticized Bush for ignoring Turkey, Iraqi Turks and neighboring Iran and Syria.

Both Barzani and Talabani see the PKK as a card to be used against Turkey and believe that the PKK terrorism withholds Turkey from tackle with them. The Barzani group ignores the PKK activities and allows the 20 PKK armed camps in their region. The number of PKK militants based in Barzani territories has been reached 3500 in 2007, and these terrorists use Northern Iraq as a base to attack Turkey. It is obvious that Mr. Barzani considers the PKK as a tool which keeps Turkey busy outside of Barzani and Talabani towns. However such a policy has been undermining Turkish-Iraqi relations.

As a matter of fact that there is no consensus on Iraqi Kurdish issue and Barzani problem: The AK Party Government searched the ways for peaceful ways and focused on mainly the economic co-operation and diplomacy. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan made efforts to solve the problem by diplomatic negotiations with the US and Iraqi Kurds. However the military and some nationalist groups are not patient enough. The increasing number of martyred Turkish soldiers killed by the PKK terrorists from Barzani regions has increased the tension in Turkey against the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. Many people now blame the United States, Barzani and Talabani for the rocketing PKK terrorism. It is really difficult for any government to defend more friendly ways in dealing with the Iraqi Kurds as long as the Iraqi Kurds ignore the PKK terrorists in their territories. In another word the most mortal impact of Barzani’s risky PKK game is the growing mistrust among the Turkish people against the Iraqi Kurds. The public pressure forces to the Government and the Army for a possible cross-border military operation and many in Turkey defend that such an operation should not be only against the PKK but also the Barzani forces. Barzani and Talabani should win the hearts and brains of the Turkish people. Otherwise the PKK terrorism problem may become a Turkish-Iraqi Kurdish problem.

There are, of course, some understandable reasons for Barzani and Talabani’s ‘pro-PKK’ behavior. As a leader who has been one of the leaders subjected to the risk of annihilation under the Saddam Rule, the Iraqi Kurdish leaders are obsessive about the idea of security. They do not want to experience similar threats. However they should also notice that the Iraqi Kurds cannot guarantee their security by only getting the American or Israeli support. Without good relations with Turkey, both Barzani and Talabani will always feel the lasting threats. In fact, Turkey could be the guarantor for the survival of the Iraqi Kurds in the region. However as long as the PKK camps exist there Turkish contribution to the Iraqi Kurdish region will be limited. The PKK terrorism has a cost for the Kurdish leaders and the Kurdish people and inevitably they will see how much this cost is:

Apart from the security costs, the second vital cost will be seen in the economic area: Turkey is the seventeenth biggest economy in the World, the fifth biggest market in Europe and has a GDP exceeding 400 billion USD in 2007. Thus with the power of Turkey’s economy, Northern Iraq will also have more opportunity to gain more economic power than the rest of Iraq. Even under these problematic circumstances Turkish businessmen made about 5 billion USD worth of contracts in Northern Iraq, and foreign trade between Turkey and the region is about 2 billion USD. The figures prove that if the political problems are solved between Turkey and the Kurdish region it is possible that total amount of contracts, bilateral trade and direct investments will reach 10 billion USD and this integration with Turkey could give Northern Iraq a valuable alternative industry to oil industry. However with the PKK camps the Iraqi Kurds may lose the current gaining in relations with Turkey.

Thirdly, it is known that the only exit point from Northern Iraq in practice is Turkey, as Syria and Iran also have serious problems of their own on the border issues. Depending on to the solution to PKK problem, decision makers are looking to build an airport near Kurdish region as well as modernize the region’s railways and extend them from Turkey to Erbil. This means that by ignoring terrorist activities Barzani and Talabani are preventing the integration of Northern Iraq with rest of the region and the whole World.

Fourthly, there has not been any significant historical hostility between Turkey and the Kurds in the history. However, with each passing day the possibility of a total confrontation is increasing as the PKK problem continues and ignored by the Kurdish leaders. This may lead to the permanent hostilities in future and will not help the Iraqi Kurds as they already have many enemies in the region.

Fifthly, improved relations between Kurds and the US following the 2003 invasion increased the hostility between Kurds, the Arabs and Shias of Iraq and many of whom sought revenge against the Kurds. There is a possibility of spreading of conflicts to the North of the country. Kerkuk problem and the ignored rights of the Turkmen people in Northern Iraq may also trigger big conflicts in the North. In other words, the Kurds may find themselves at the heart of a bloody civil war. If they have a difficulty again Turkey could be one of the countries –if not be the only country- who may save the Kurds. Turkey may be a guarantor for the Kurds in the region and protect them from domestic and foreign threats but of course, this again depends on the existence of the PKK terrorists in the Northern Iraq. While the PKK deploys in the region it seems impossible for Turkey to be in the position of being guarantor for the Kurds. Besides, as long as Kurdish officials ignore Turkey’s warnings over Kerkuk, the Turkmens in the region and allows PKK activities, there will be always the possibility of a military confrontation.

Sixthly, Barzani and Talabani clearly declared that they can not defend the Turkish-Iraqi border because they have no enough power to tackle with the PKK terrorists. In this sense it is now increasingly said that the Iraqi side of the border must be protected by the Turkish military. Even some of the groups in Turkey are claiming that as Barzani is not governing the region in accordance with Turkish interests the other tribes should be supported by Turkey to bring down Barzani’s government. Although the Turkish government does not share the same idea, it is possible some of these groups might have the power to destabilize the region if the PKK insists on staying. Emerging of anti-Barzani or anti-Talabani groups in Turkey would not be wise for the Barzani and Talabani, and they should not nourish the mistrust among the Turks.

As can be seen from the above arguments, the existence of the PKK camps in the region comes at a higher price than supposed, and Barzani must choose the most advantageous way to secure the Iraqi Kurdish interests.

http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/49635/what-is-the-cost-of-the-pkk-for-barzani.html/

19 July 2007
By Serpil ACIKALIN, U.S.A.K.
srpll@yahoo.com

A Short Bibliography of Turkish Foreign Policy

Serpil ACIKALIN, USAK
Thursday , 27 September 2007
Introductory Readings

Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, SAIS Review, (Winter-Spring 1999).

Andrew Mango, Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role (Westport, CT. Publication Year, 1994).
Aydın, Mustafa, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol 36, (Jan 2000), 103-139

B. Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy: 1934-1942”, Middle Eastern Studies, 31:3 (1995), 483-508.

Barry Rubin Kemal Kirisci, eds., Turkey in World Politics (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001)

Clement H. Dodd, Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects (Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 1992).

Ertan Efegil, “Foreign Policy-Making in Turkey: A Legal Perspective”, Turkish Studies (Spring 2001), pp.147-60.

Mehmet Gönlübol, ‘A Short Appraisal of The Turkish Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic, 1923-1973’, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. XIV, pp. 1-19.

F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty (Santa Monica, California: RAND 2003).

F. Tayfur and K. Göymen, “Decision-Making in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Caspian Oil Pipeline Issue”, Middle Eastern Studies (April 2002) pp.101-22.

Hans Kramer, A Changing Turkey – The Challenge to Europe and the United States. (Brookings Institution Press, 2000).

Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1995).

Kemal Kirişçi,“Uluslararası Sistemdeki Değişmeler ve Türk Dış Politikasının YeniYönelimleri”, Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, Faruk Sönmezoğlu, (der.), ( İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1998.) ss. 393-408.

Lenore Martin and Dimitris Keridis, eds, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004).
Oral Sander, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and of Change", Turkish Review, Vol. 7, No. 34 (1993), p.p. 31-46.

Oran, Baskin (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001) Vol 1 ve 2

Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (Seattle:University of Washington Press, 2003).

Sedat Laçiner, Ideological Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy, unpublished PhD Thesis, King’s College, University of London, 2001.

Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Şaban Çalış, Foreign Policy Agenda of Turkey: Identity, Democracy and Security, (Ankara: Liberty Yayınları, 2001).

Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (eds.), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. A Changing Role in World Politics (Ashgate Pub.: New York, 2003).

Haluk Ulman, ‘Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler 1923-1968’ (Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy I), Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi, 1968, Vol.: XXIII, No. 3.

William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

Yasemin Çelik, “The Foundations of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Yasemin Çelik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, 1999, p.p. 1-25.


Foreign Policy Culture: The Ottoman and Republican Legacies

A. Macfie, “The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No.2. (1989), p.p. 238-48.

Brock Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934-1942”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3(July 1995), p.p. 483-508.

C. D. Haley, “the Desperate Ottoman: Enver Paşa and the German Empire, II”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1994), p.p. 224-251.

C. Okman, “Turkish Foreign Policy: Principles-Rules-Trends, 1814-2003”, in Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era, (ed. Idris Bal) 2004, p.p. 5-26.

David Kushner, “Mustafa Kemal and His Period in the Eyes of the Hebrew Press and Publications in Palestine”, International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (198586), p.p. 95-106.

Ekavi Atanassopoulou, “Western Defense Developments and Turkey’s Search for Security in 1948”, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr. 1996), p.p. 77-108.

Ellen Marie Lust-Okar, “Failure of Collaboration: Armenian Refugees in Syria”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1(Jan. 1996), p.p. 53-68. (Armenians during Mandate era Syria)

F. A .K. Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy, Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888,
(İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 1996).

Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics,
1908-1914, (Oxford: 1969).

Feroz Ahmad, “The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy”, Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Kerides (eds.), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), p.p. 9-36.

G. Leiser, “The Turkish Air Force, 1939-1945: The Rise of a Minor Power”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (1990), p.p. 383-395.

Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman
Empire,1908-1918, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

Helmut Mejcher, “Iraq’s External Relations, 1921-1926”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 13 (October 1977), p.p. 340-357.

Ismail Soysal, “The 1937 Saadabad Pack”, Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, Vol. 3 (1988), p.p. 131-157.

Kamuran Gürün, “The First World War”, The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), p.p. 186-245.

Kemal Melek, “Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri (1890--1926) ve Musul Petrolleri”, in Esat Çam ve Toktamış Ateş, Türk Dış Politikasında Sorunlar (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1989), p.p. 25-79.

Marian Kent, “British Policy, International Diplomacy and the Turkish Revolution”, International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 3 (Winter 1985-1986), p.p. 33-51.

M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, ‘Jön Türkler ve Osmanlı’da İç-Dış Politika Bağlantısı’ (Jon Turks and the
Connection Between the Foreign and Domestic Politics in the Ottomans), in Faruk Sönmezoğlu
(ed.), Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), (İstanbul: Der
Yayınları, 1994), p.p. 333-355.

Matthew S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774 - 1923: A Study of International Relations,
(London: Macmillan, 1966).

Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change (London: Routledge Curzon, 2005).

Metin Heper, “The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Fall 2000), p.p. 63-82.

Metin Heper, “The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics”, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, No. 1, 2000, p.p. 63-83

Mim Kemal Öke, “The Ottoman Empire, Zionism, and the Question of Palestine (1880-1908)”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 14 (August 1982), p.p. 329-341.

Peter J. Beck, “A Tedious and Perilous Controversy: Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926”, Middle East Studies, Vol. 17 (April 1981), p.p. 256- 276.

Richard G. Hovannisian, “The Historical Dimensions of the Armenian Question, 1878-1923”, in
Richard G. Hovanisian, The Armenian Genocide in Perspective (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1988), p.p. 19-39.

Robert Melson, “Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry into the Armenian Genocide of 1915”, in Richard G. Hovanisian, The Armenian Genocide in Perspective (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1988), p.p. 61-84.

Robert Olson, “The Churchill-Cox Correspondence Regarding The Creation of the State of Iraq: Consequences for British Policy Towards the Nationalist Turkish Government, 1921-1923.” International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1985/81), p.p. 121-136.

Robert Olson, “The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said(1925), Mt. Ararat(1930), and Dersim (1937-38): Their Impact on the Development of the Turkish Air Force and on Kurdish and Turkish Nationalism”, Welt des Islams, Vol. 40, No. 1(March 2000), p.p. 67-94.

Robert Olson, “The Second Time Around: British Policy Toward the Kurds from Mudros to Lausanne” and “The International Aspects of the Sheikh Said Rebellion”, in The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism 1800-1925”, Univ of Texas Pr (1991) p.p. 128-152, 205-209.

Roderic Davison, “Ottoman Diplomacy and Its Legacy”, in Carl Brown (ed.), Imperial Legacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 174-199.

Roger R. Trask, “Rejection of the Lausanne Treaty and Resumption of Diplomatic Relations, 1923-1927”, in The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939 (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p.p. 37- 64.

Şaban Çalış, “Pan-Turkism and Europeanism: A Note on Turkey’s ‘Pro-German Neutrality’ During the Second World War”, CAS, 16, No.1, (1997),p.p. 103-114.

Salahi R. Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia”, Middle Eastern Studies. Vol.26, n.1, (1990), p.p.52-64.

Selim Deringil, “Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdulhamid II and Ismet Inönü”, International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, No.1 (1987), p.p. 39-54.

Selim Deringil, “Process of Government and the Foreign Policy Leadership”, in Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.p. 41-57.

Selim Deringil, “The Economic Background”, in Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality, p.p. 12-30.

Selim Deringil, “The Historical Conditioning of a Generation”, in Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality, p.p. 58-70.

Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Notes on the Young Turks and the Freemasons, 1875- 1908”, Middle Eastern Studies. 25 (1989), p.p. 188-191

Vigen Guroian, “Collective Responsibility and official Excuse Making: The Case of the Turkish Genocide of the Armenians”, in Richard G. Hovanisian, The Armenian Genocide in Perspective (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1988), p.p. 135-152.

William Hale, “Economic Issues in Turkish Foreign Policy”, in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p.p.20-38.

Early Republican Years Foreign Policy

Abdülahat Akşin, Atatürk’ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi, (Ankara: TTK, 1991).

Bülent Gökay, A Clash of Empires: Turkey Between Russian Bolshevism and British
Imperialism, 1918-1923, (London: Tauris, 1997).

Enver Ziya Karal, ‘The Principles of Kemalism’ in Kazancıgil and Ozbudun (eds.) in Kazancigil,
Ali and Ergun Ozbudun (eds.), Atatürk, Founder of a Modern State, (London: Hurst&Company,
1997).

Mehmet Gönlübol ve Cem Sar, Atatürk ve Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (1919-1938), (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1990).

Mohammad Sadiq, ‘Intellectual Origins of the Turkish National Liberation Movement’,
International Studies (New Delhi), Vol. 15, 1976, p.p. 509-529.

Oral Sander, , ‘Nationalism and Peace, The Significance of Atatürk’s Movement’, Turkish
Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. XX, 1980-1981, p.p. 245-263.

Salahi R. Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923, Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish
National Movement, (London: SAGE Publications, 1975).

Salahi R Sonyel, Atatürk -The Founder of Modern Turkey, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society
Printing House, 1989).

Selim Deringil, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923, (London: Sage Publications, 1975).

Speros Jr.Vryonis, The Turkish State and History, Clio Meets the Grey Wolf, Second Edition,
(New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publishers, 1993).

Stephen F Evans, The Slow Rapprochement, Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatürk,
1919 - 1938, (University of Hull, 1982).

Tamkoç, Metin, The Warrior Diplomats, Guardians of the National Security and
Modernization of Turkey, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press 1976).

Türkkaya Ataöv, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1938’, Turkish Yearbook of International
Relations, 1961, p.p. 103-142.

Türkkaya Ataöv, ‘The Principles of Kemalism’, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations
(TYIR), Vol. XX, 1980-1981, p.p. 19-44.

Post Second World War Era


Deniz Atiye Erden, Turkish Foreign Policy Through the United Nations, 1960-1970,
unpublished PhD thesis, (University of Massachusetts, 1974),p.p. 46-47.

Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945, Small State Diplomacy and Great
Power Politics, (Princeton University Press, 1973).

Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Türk Dış Politikası, II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan Günümüze, (İstanbul: Der, 2006).

Ferenc A.Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, The Foreign Policy of Turkey, (Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).

George Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish - American Problems in Historical Perspective,
1945 - 1971, (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1972).

Hamit Batu, ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy’, Bulletin of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, No.
6, (March 1965), p.p. 21-25.

‘Johnson’s 1964 Letter to Inönü and the Greek Lobbying at the White House’, Turkish Yearbook
of International Relations / Milletlerarasi Münasebetler Yilligi, Vol. XVI, 1974, p.p. 45-58.

McGhee, George C., ‘Turkey Joins the West’, World Affairs, (July 1954), p.p. 617-630.

Nurhan İnce, Problems and Politics in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1960 - 1966, With Emphasis on
Turkish - United States Relations, The Cyprus Question, and the Leftist Movement,
unpublished PhD thesis,(University of Kentucky, 1974.)

Sanjian, Ara, ‘The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact’, The Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No.2 (April 1996), p.p. 226-266.

Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War An ‘Active’Neutrality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Türkkaya Ataöv, Turkish Foreign Policy, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1965).


1980-2007 Years in Turkish Foreign Policy

Gencer Özcan and Şule Kut, En Uzun On Yıl, Türkiye’nin Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar, (İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, Mart 2000).

Graham Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, Turkey’s New Geopolitics, (Boulder: Westview Press and RAND, 1993).

Gülnur Aybet, Turkey’s Foreign Policy and Its Implications for the West: A Turkish Perspective, (London: RUSI, 1994).

Sedat Laçiner, ‘Özal Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası’, içinde T. Göksu vd., 1980-2003 Türkiye’nin Dış, Ekonomik, Sosyal ve İdari Politikaları, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2003), p.p. 25-48.

Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds), Turkey between East and West, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).

William Hale, ‘Turkish Foreign Policy After the Cold War’, in Turkish Review of BalkanStudies, (İstanbul: ISIS, 1993).

William Hale,‘Generals and Politicians in Turkey: 1983-1990’, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1995, XXV, p.p. 1-20.

William Hale, Identities and Politics in Turkey, unpublished SOAS seminar Paper,( 7 October 1999).

Zeynep Dağı (Ed.), Doğu’dan Batı’ya Dış Politika, AK Partili Yıllar, (Ankara: Orion Yayınevi, 2006).

Turkish Foreign Policy During the Cold War

Alan Makovsky, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”, SAIS Review, Winter-Spring 1999

B. Millman, “The Turkish Armed Forces on the Eve of the Second World War: The British View”, TSA Bulletin, 20:1, (1996), p.p. 38-55.

Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, “Turkey’s Participation in the Middle East Command and Its Admission to NATO”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Oct. 1999), p.p. 70-102.

Faruk Sönmezoğlu, ‘Dünya ve Türkiye’, İktisat Dergisi, Sayı 429, Eylül 2002, p.p. 5-19.

Gencer Özkan, “Doksanlarda Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi”, (der), Gencer Özkan, Sule Kut, En Uzun On Yıl, 1998, p.p. 67-101.

Gencer Özkan, “Doksanlarda Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politikasında Askeri Yapının Artan Etkisi”, (der), Gencer Özkan, Sule Kut, En Uzun On Yıl, 1998, p.p.67-101.

Gerassimos Karabelias, “The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in post-War Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4(Oct. 1999), p.p. 130-151.

Haluk Gerger, From Cold War to New World Order: Turkish Foreign Policy, (Belge Yayınları, İstanbul ,1998)

Ian O. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier: Turkey and the West After the Cold War (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1992).

İdris Bal , Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, (Alfa İstanbul 2005)

İdris Bal, Turkey's relations with the West and the Turkic Republics : the Rise and Fall of the 'Turkish model', (London 2000).

Kemal Kirişçi, ‘Uluslararası sistemdeki Değişmeler ve Türk Dış Politikasının Yeni Yönelimleri’, (der), F. Sönmezoglu, Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, (Der Yayinlari, 1998, Istanbul). p.p. 393-408.

Mustafa Aydin, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol 36, No: 1, (Jan 2000), p.p.103-139

Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Jan. 2000), p.p. 103-139.

Oral Sander”,Yeni Bölgesel Güç Olarak Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Hedefleri”, Türk Dış Politikası Analizi, F. Sönmezoglu (der), Der Yayınları, 1994, p.p. 419-425.

Şule Kut, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasının Ana Hatları”, in Kut and Gencer Özcan (eds.), En Uzun On Yıl: Türkiye'nin Ulusal ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1998), p.p. 45-64.

Yasemin Çelik, “Fluctuations in Cold War Foreign Policy” in Yasemin Çelik, Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy, 1999, p.p. 46-75.

Foreign Policy Trends in the Post-Cold War Era

Berdal Aral, “Dispensing with Tradition?: Turkish Politics and International Society during the
Ozal Decade, 1983-93”, Middle Eastern Studies, (January 2001), p.p. 72-88.

Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, “Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 2003, p.p. 169-196.

Gilles Dorronsoro, “The EU and Turkey”, Roland Dannreuther (ed.), European Union Foreign and Security Policy, 2004, p.p. 48-61.

Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p.p. 136-160 and 207-238.

Sabri Sayarı, “ Turkey and the United States: Changing Dynamics of an Enduring Alliance”, Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (eds.), Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. A Changing Role in World Politics (Ashgate Pub.: New York, 2003)

Sabri Sayarı, “Turkey: The Changing European Security Environment and the Gulf Crisis”, The Middle East Journal, (Winter 1992), 9-21.

Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi Regionalism, Journal of International Affairs,Vol.54 (Fall 2000), 169-182.

Ziya Öniş, “Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity”, The Middle East Journal (Winter 1995), 48-68.


The Domestic Context of Foreign Policy

A.Mango, “Turks and Kurds”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1994), p.p. 975-997.

Ali Çarkoğlu, Mine Eder, “Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris Basin”, Middle East Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1(Jan. 2001), p.p. 41-72.

Andrew Mango, “Reflections on the Atatürkist Origins of Turkish Foreign Policy and Domestic Linkages”, in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p.p.9-19.

Demir, Ali Faik, Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler (Leaders in Turkish Foreign Policy), ( İstanbul: Bağlam, 2007).

Ersel Aydinli, Nihat Ali Özcan, and Dogan Akyaz. “The Turkish Military’s March Toward Europe”, Foreign Affairs, Vol.85, No.1 (January/February 2006),p.p. 77-90.

Fotios Moustakis and Rudra Chaudhuri, “Turkish-Kurdish Relations and the European Union: an Unprecedented Shift in the Kemalist Paradigm?”, in Mediterranean Quarterly, (Fall 2005), p.p. 77 – 89

Graham E. Fuller, “The Fate of the Kurds”, in Foreign Affairs, (Spring 1993), p.p. 109-121.

Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, G. Fuller, “Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Critical a Turning Points and Missed Opportunities”, Middle East Journal , Vol.51, No:1(1997), p.p.59-79.

Kemal Kirişçi, “The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy”, Martin and Keridis, The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, p.p.277-314.

M. Gunter “The Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey”, Journal of South Asia and Middle East Studies, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1990), p.p. 57-81.

Mesut Yegen, “The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2(Apr. 1996), p.p. 216-229.

Michael Radu, “The Rise and Fall of the PKK”, Orbis, Vol. 45, No. 1(Winter 2001), p.p. 47-63.
Philip Robins, “The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue” International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4 (1993), p.p. 657-676.

Robert Olson, “Kurds and Turks: Two Documents Concerning Kurdish Autonomy in 1923 and 1923”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XV, No. 2 (Winter 1991), p.p. 2031.

Robert Olson, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey’s Foreign Policy, 1991-1995:From the Gulf War to the Incursion into Iraq”, JSAMES, 19:1 (1995), p.p.1-30.

Robert Olson, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East , (Univ Pr of Kentucky,1996)

Svante E. Cornell, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics”, Orbis, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 2001), p.p. 31-46.


Serpil AÇIKALIN

http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/243/a-short-bibliography-of-turkish-foreign-policy.html

September 2007
USAK

Abbas ve Peres Ziyaretleri Kapsamında Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Barışına Katkısı

Serpil AÇIKALIN, USAK

Ortadoğu’da II. Körfez Savaşı'nın patlak vermesi ve aynı döneme denk gelen Soğuk Savaş yıllarının sona ermesi aynı zamanda bölgedeki dengelerinde değiştiğinin sinyalleriydi. 1990’lı yıllar, 40 yılı aşkın süredir devam eden Arap-İsrail gerginliğini sona erdirmek için bölgedeki etkinliğini arttırma çabasında olan ABD’nin sponsorluğunda gerçekleştirilen barış görüşmelerine tanıklık etti. Ancak büyük umutlarla yola çıkılan Oslo Süreci ve başarısızlıkla sonuçlanan Camp David görüşmeleri sonrası II. İntifada ile Filistin’de ortaya çıkan toplumsal patlama, 11 Eylül Olayları, Afganistan ve Irak’ın ABD tarafından işgal edilmesi bu süreçte Ortadoğu’nun “dünyanın kaynayan kazanı” olmasına neden oldu. Günümüzde bölgenin hemen her ülkesinin iç siyasetinde halen devam eden karışıklıklar ve komşu ülkelerle yaşanan problemler bu ülkelerin kalkınma ve gelişmeye yönelik iç politika izlemek yerine, günü kurtarmak ve sistemin devamını sağlamaya çalışmaktan öteye gidememesine yol açmaktadır.Türkiye’de devam eden sınır ötesi operasyon tartışmaları, Dışişleri Bakanı Babacan’ın Ortadoğu ziyareti sırasında bölge ülkelerine olası operasyonla ilgili bilgi vermesi, Suriye Devlet Başkanı Başer Esad’ın ziyareti, hafta sonu İstanbul’da yapılan Genişletilmiş Irak’a Komşu Ülkeler Konferansına bölge ülkeleri, ABD ve BM tarafından yapılan üst düzey katılım, Suudi Arabistan Kralı Abdullah Bin Abdülaziz El-Suud’un bu hafta yaptığı ziyaret ve Pazartesi ve Salı günü İsrail Devlet Başkanı Şimon Peres ve Filistin Devlet Başkanı Mahmud Abbas’ın Türkiye’ye gerçekleştireceği ziyaret Türkiye açısından yaşanan hareketliliği kanıtlamaktadır.Esad’ın yaptığı ziyaret, olası bir PKK operasyonu konusunda destek olarak yorumlanırken, bölge ülkeleriyle ve ABD ile sorunları devam eden Suriye’nin Türkiye için ne kadar iyi bir müttefik olabileceği tartışmalarını da ortaya çıkardı. Irak ve Filistin konularında Türkiye ile benzer bir siyaset izlemekte olan Suudi Arabistan Kralı Abdullah Bin Abdülaziz El-Suud ise Avrupa Ülkelerine yaptığı ziyaret sonrası Türkiye’ye gelerek üst düzey yetkililerce ağırlandı ve iki ülke arasında birçok alanda işbirliğini içeren ortak bir deklarasyon imzalandı.Ortadoğu bölgesine baktığımızda aktörleri ABD’nin müttefiki Mısır, Ürdün ve Körfez ülkelerinin oluşturduğu Sünni blok; İran, Suriye ve Lübnan’ın oluşturduğu radikal blok; Türkiye, İsrail ve bölgenin dışında yer almakla birlikte bölgenin iplerini elinde bulunduran ABD olarak sınıflandırabiliriz.Son dönemde Lübnan’da yeterli meclis çoğunluğu sağlanamadığı için bir türlü yapılamayan ve Türkiye’deki Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimleri dönemini anımsatan Cumhurbaşkanlığı Seçimleri, 14 Mart Grubunun başını çektiği ABD yanlısı grubun galip gelmesiyle bu ülkenin de giderek ABD yanlısı politika izleyerek ılımlı ülkeler kategorisine girmesiyle sonuçlanabilir. Ancak Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimleri sonrası kırılgan yapısıyla bilinen Lübnan’da yeni bir iç savaş çıkma olasılığı da yapılan yorumlar arasındadır.Kasım ayındaki diğer bir önemli konu ise ABD’de Kasım ayının sonunda yapılması planlanan Barış Konferansıdır. Annapolis’te yapılması planlanan Ortadoğu Barış Konferansı ile ilgili Condoleezza Rice’ın aylardır bölgeye sık sık yaptığı ziyaretler sonrasında hala imza atılacak bir taslak oluşturulamadı. İsrail ve Filistin arasında yıllardır devam eden ve çözüm noktasında kilitlenmeye neden olan konuların(başkenti Kudüs olan bağımsız bir Filistin Devletinin kurulması, mültecilerin geri dönüş hakkı konusu, Sınırlar, Kudüs’ün Statüsü) bu Konferansta ele alınmaması halinde her iki taraf içinde büyük bir hayal kırıklığıyla sonuçlanacaktır ve Hamas’ın eli daha da güçlenecektir.Hamas lideri İsmail Haniye’nin dışta bırakıldığı ve Bush Hükümetinin görev süresinin dolmasından önce yapılması planlanan bu konferansa bölge ülkelerinin yoğun katılımı sağlanmaya çalışılıyor. Özellikle Suudi Arabistan ve İsrail tarafından, Suriye’nin de konferansa katılması konusunda ABD’ye baskı yapması aynı zamanda bu ülkelerin bölgede istikrar arayışında olduğunun bir göstergesidir ve konferansın meşruiyetini arttırma çabası olarak yorumlanabilir.Bu hafta Suriye tarafından Annaopolis Barış Konferansına ancak ilhak edilen Golan Tepelerinin geri verilmesi koşulu ile katılacağı yönünde bir açıklama yapıldı. Suriye-İsrail arasında bir süredir devam eden ve barış masasına oturmak üzereyken son anda iptal olan barış görüşmelerinde ve bundan sonra yapılacak olan her hangi bir görüşmede Suriye için doğal bir koruma alanı niteliğinde olan Golan Tepelerinin geri alınması öncelikli olacaktır. Bush Hükümeti tarafından yapılması konusunda ısrar edilen Annapolis Barış Görüşmeleri aynı zamanda “barış için toprak” anlayışının hala devam edip etmeyeceğini de gösterecektir.Bununla birlikte Kudüs konusunda zaten baskı altında bulunan ve yerleşimcilerin protestolarının giderek arttığı İsrail’de, Golan Tepeleri konusunun gündeme getirilmesi Barış Görüşmelerinin daha da gecikmesi veya Suriye’nin çağrılmaması sonucunu doğurabilir. Bu konferansa Türkiye’nin de davet edilmesi bekleniyor ve Türkiye bu hafta İsrail ve Filistin Devlet Başkanlarını ağırlıyor.2005 yılından itibaren TOBB’un öncülüğünde devam eden görüşmelerde gelinen son aşama olan 7. Ankara Forumu Toplantısı dolayısıyla TOBB’un katkılarıyla bir araya gelecek olan Türk, İsrail ve Filistin tarafları, Batı Şeria’da kurulacak olan sanayi bölgesinin TOBB tarafından kurulması ve işletilmesiyle ilgili mutabakat metnine imza atacaklar. Şimon Peres’in Türkiye ziyareti sırasında Irak konusunda yumuşak bir federal Irak hükümeti fikrini destekleyen, bölünmüş bir Irak’ı kendi çıkarları için tehlike olarak gören ve aynı zamanda terör konusunda hassasiyeti olan İsrail tarafından yapılacak olan açıklamalar, İsrail’in de terör konusunda bölgesel işbirliğine katılımının sağlanabilmesi bakımından önem arz etmektedir. 13 Kasım tarihinde yapılması planlanan Abbas ve Peres tarafından TBMM’de yapılacak olan konuşma da bir ilk olarak tarihe yazılacak. Şimdiye dek Ehud Olmert ile görüşmelerini devam ettiren Mahmud Abbas, mevkidaşı olan Şimon Peres ile bir araya gelecek ve iki lider TBMM’de birbirini dinleyecek.Kasım ayı, hem Türkiye hem de komşuları için yeni gelişmelerin ortaya çıkacağı çok önemli bir ay gibi görünmektedir. Devam eden operasyon tartışmalarına rağmen İsrail ve Filistin Devlet Başkanlarının Türkiye’ye davet edilmesi ve bir Müslüman ülke parlamentosunda ilk kez bir İsrail Cumhurbaşkanının konuşma yapması çok önemli bir gelişmedir. Türkiye’nin bölgedeki arabulucu rolünü tekrar üstlenmesi ve Suriye, Lübnan, İran gibi ülkelerle devam eden ilişkilerine rağmen aynı zamanda ABD ve İsrail gibi ülkelerle de bir araya gelebilmesi büyük bir başarıdır. Bu noktada Lübnan’da tekrar Kasım ayının sonuna ertelenen Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerinde de Türkiye’nin benzer bir çaba göstererek, yakın dönemde yapılan Babacan’ın ziyaretinden sonra Lübnan’a tekrar üst düzey bir ziyarette bulunması ve bu yolla bölge barışına katkıda bulunması gerekmektedir.Unutulmamalıdır ki Türkiye Başbakanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Ocak 2007 de Lübnan ziyareti sırasında Başbakan Fuad Sinyora, Gelecek Hareketi Lideri Saad Hariri, Suriye yanlısı Cumhurbaşkanı Emil Lahud ve Hizbullah’a yakın Meclis Başkanı Nebih Berri ile bir araya gelerek temaslarda bulunmuştur. Birbirlerine rakip olarak görülen bu gruplarla bir araya gelmek dünyadaki hiçbir devletin başaramayacağı bir durumdur. Türkiye’nin bölgedeki ilişkilerinde pek çok yönden avantajlı konumda olmasının en önemli sebebi Arap olmayan ancak büyük çoğunluğu Müslüman olan bu ülkenin tüm bölge ülkeleri tarafından kendisine yakın görülmesidir. Türkiye bu eşsiz konumunu Kasım ayında yoğun olarak kullanmak zorundadır.

Serpil AÇIKALIN

.........http://www.usakgundem.com/haber/15506/

12 Kasım 2007

Seçimlerin Ardından, Araplar İçin En İyi Türk Hükümeti Hangisi?

Serpil Açıkalın
22 Temmuz’da Türkiyede gerçekleşen genel seçimler hiç şüphesiz ki Ortadoğu bölgesindeki tüm ülkeler tarafından yakından takip edildi ve seçimle ilgili yorumlar hala devam ediyor. Bugünlerde ise Arap medyasında tartışmanın boyutu ordu ve AKP’nin ilşikilerinin izleyeceği seyir ve cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerine hangi adayların katılacağı konusuna kaymış durumda. Bununla birlikte Pazar günü yapılan seçim, yıllardır hem Türkiye’deki bazı kesimler hem de Araplar arasında tartışılan ‘Türkiye Ortadoğu da öncü bir ülke olabilirmi?’ sorusunu da gündeme getirdi.Bölgedeki pek çok Arap gazetesi yazarı, AKP nin %47 gibi ezici bir çoğunlukla seçimleri kazanmış olmasına haberlerinde geniş yer verdi ve 22 Temmuz’da yapılan seçimler sadece Türkiye’de değil aynı zamanda dünya medyasında da büyük bir ilgiyle izlendi. BBC, CNN, El Cezire ve El Arabiye gibi televizyon kanalları seçim bölgelerinde istihdam ettikleri habercilerle seçim sonuçlarını izleyicilerine duyurdu. Türkiye’deki seçimlerin hem bölge hem de Avrupa ülkeleri tarafından gördüğü ilgi, aslında ülkede uzun süredir devam eden gerginliğin sonucunu merak etme şeklinde de yorumlanabilir. Türkiye’nin Ortadoğu bölgesinde tam anlamıyla demokratik seçimlerin yapılabildiği sayılı ülkelerden biri olması ve içinde bulunduğu istikrarsız çevrede nispeten istikrarlı bir çizgi izlemesi de pek çok analistin dikkat çektiği bir konuların başında geliyor. Mısır ve Suriye gibi ülkelere baktığımızda seçimlerden %97-98 gibi oranlarla çıkan otoriter/yarı otoriter liderler ve cumhuriyet olarak anıldığı halde babaların çocuklarını liderliğe hazırladığı dönemler görüyoruz. Suriye’de 1970-2000 yılları arasında yönetimde bulunan Hafız Esad rejimini izleyen Beşar Esad rejimi ve Mısır’da 1981 yılından beri ülkeyi yöneten Hüsnü Mübarek rejimi Ortadoğuda uzun yıllardır devam eden ve yakın dönemde değişmesi beklenemyen yarı otoriter rejimler arasında sayılabilir. Bölgedeki diğer ülkeler ise büyük oranda ya Krallık ya da Meşruti Krallık yoluyla yönetiliyor. Kuveyt’te kadınların seçme ve seçilme hakkını 2006 yılında elde ettiğini ve Suudi Arabistan’da hala kadınların oy kullanma hakkının olmadığını düşündüğümüzde Türkiye’nin hem laik hem de Müslüman kimliğiyle bölgede sahip olduğu önem daha da fazla göze çarpıyor. Arap medyasına baktığımızda seçimler konusunda bazı ayrışmalar görebiliyoruz. Arap basınında genel olarak Arap milliyetçiliği veya İslamcı düşünce dışında AKP’nin “ılımlı İslam” çizgisini kendi ülkelerinde de görmek isteyen, Türk televizyonlarından parlamento da yaşanan tartışmaları izlediklerinde imrenen insanlar mevcut. Son dört yıldır AKP Hükümeti’nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliği konusunda gösterdiği hassasiyet, yapılan reformlar ve başörtüsü konusundaki tartışmalar Türkiye’de olduğu kadar Arap medyasında da yankı bulan konular arasında yer alıyor. Milliyetçi Arap yazarlar arasında, Türkiyenin Avrupa Birliği’ne üye olması, yakın dönemde yaşanan cumhurbaşkanlığı krizi, Nisan ayında düzenlenen mitingler ve sonrasında gelen erken seçim kararı ile yaşanan hareketlilikten dolayı eleştiren yazarların yanısıra, laik bir sisteme sahip olduğu için Türkiye’yi eleştiren yazarlar da azımsanmayacak kadar fazla.Yabancı basında ve akademi dünyasında Türkiye, cumhuriyetin kurulmasından günümüze ordu etkisinin yönetimde yoğun bir şekilde hissedildiği ve dönem dönem darbelerin yaşandığı, halkının büyük bir çoğunluğu Müslüman olan laik bir ülke olarak tanımlanıyor. 22 Temmuz seçimlerinde de Arap basının konuya yaklaşımı ‘ılımlı İslamı’ temsil eden AKP Hükümeti’ne karşı ‘orduyu ve laikliği temsil eden ana muhalefet partisi CHP arasındaki çekişme’ şeklinde oldu. Lübnan’ın önde gelen gazetelerinden Dar El Hayat gazetesi yazarı Cihad El Hazin’in AKP’nin açık farkla galip geldiği seçimlerdeki başarısının ardından 25 Temmuz tarihinde yazdığı yazının başlığı “Araplar için en iyi Türk hükümeti” şeklinde oldu. El Hazin, AKP’nin Arap Dünyasındaki liderler için örnek olmasını ve Arap partilerinin artık slogan atmaktan vazgeçerek AKP’nin ekonomide ve Avrupa Birliği sürecinde gerçekleştirdiği reformların benzerlerini uygulamaları gerektiğini yazısında vurguluyordu. Erdoğan’ın ''Sandıkta birlik ve beraberliğimiz, demokrasimiz ve cumhuriyetimiz daha da güçlenerek çıkmıştır'' açıklaması ve çoğulcu, anayasal hukuk devleti olan Türkiye’nin yaşadığı deneyimin otoriter rejimler altında yönetilen bölge halkı için çok şey ifade ettiği söylenebilir. Bölgede son dönemde İsrail, Suriye, İran ve Amerika arasındaki görüşmelerde Türkiye’nin üstleneceği rol ne olacak sorusuna cevap aranırken AKP’nin, seçimler sonrası Arap medyasında yapılan yorumları iyi değerlendirilerek bölge ülkeleri ile ilişkileri, gelecekteki fırsatları ve geçmişte yapılan hataları tekrar gözden geçirilmesi gerekiyor.

Serpil Açıkalın

http://www.turkishweekly.net/

27 Temmuz 2007